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Let us remember Wittgenstein’s main assertions in 
Tractatus. As everyone knows Wittgenstein suggests a 
theory of language called “picture theory”, according to 
which every word names an object or every word 
represents something. The proposition in Tractatus 
concerned with this idea is “ A name means an object. The 
object is its meaning ”(3.203). 
Accepting that every name is to be the name of 
something to which it refers, then it becomes clear that 
there is no word or name which does not refer to an object. 
So this view becomes intelligible when the whole domain 
of language is thought to be consisting of names or nouns 
as Tractatus itself supposes. Here as one may realise 
though we are aware of that the object to which a name 
refers is the meaning of the name, we do not contemplate 
the relation of a name to an object as the relation or 
reference of a name to a “ meaning ” just for not presenting 
a third constituent for this relation. As one may recognise 
the notion of referential relation1 has already slipped into 
our arguments. Now it seems reasonable to point out that 
there is a referential relation between a name and what a 
name stands for or refers to. In other words naming activity 
necessitates a referential relation between a name and an 
object. However such a referential relation between a 
name and an object can be made clear by means of 
examining each part of this relation. 
To consider the first part of this relation, it can be 
said that to name is to name something, in other words a 
name is the name of something. That is to say every name 
supposes a relation in which the representation of 
something in some way is unavoidable. In order to be able 
to talk about a name we have an inevitable reference or 
relation to what is non-name or an object. Without a 
reference to an object it is impossible to speak of a naming 
activity. The act of naming is always going to be the act of 
naming something or an object. Where an act of naming is 
supposed, the existence of an object to be named is also 
supposed. 
Now if we consider the nature of such a referential 
relation between a language and an object from the object 
part, then we can say that in the referential relation of 
languages, there is always an object to be named or to be 
referred to. Conceivably, when there is no something to be 
named, then the act of naming becomes unintelligible. If 
there is no an object to be named, then the act of naming, 
if correct, would not exist at all. For if there is an object to 
be named, then the act of naming, which may be thought 
to be in a referential relation to the object, will become 
understandable. To use another method for the 
clarification of the view, it can be said that if the object is 
the meaning of the word, suppose that there is not an 
object to be named it means there is no an act of naming 
either due to that an act of naming must have a meaning. 
An act of naming without a meaning would not mean 
much, for Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein every name must 
have a meaning simply by depending upon the existence 
of an object to which it has a referential relation. So the 
elimination of the object from this referential relation will 
                                                     
1  As becomes clear, throughout this paper I will use the terms “ 
relation  ”, “ reference ”, “ referential relation ” interchangeably. 
mean that the language that we use will not have any 
meaning. Given an example, let us have the word “ ofsu ” 
in mind, if there is not an object which corresponds to this 
word, then we cannot talk of an act of naming an object 
which is called “ ofsu ”, simply because the meaning of the 
word “ ofsu ” and that of related act of naming is missing. 
To have a meaningful language means to have a language 
domain where each name or word is in a referential 
relation to an object, which is the meaning of the language 
used, as to Tractatus. 
In addition to having names which does not refer 
to an object such as “ ofsu ”, we can also take some 
attention on the cases where some names refer to objects2 
which do not exist. The round square, unicorn and similar 
names attempts to name things which do not exist. So how 
is this possible, if possible, on what ground could they be 
accepted as having a meaning, it still remains questionable 
on the part of Wittgenstein. 
So far we have tried to show that there is a 
referential relation which is describable in Tractatus. But 
now by following a similar line of reasoning we will attempt 
to clarify that there is also a referential relation which one 
may describe in Philosophical Investigations. At this point 
let us recall the main assertions of Later Wittgenstein 
concerning the theory of language: later theory of meaning 
has a claim of defining language in a different way. First of 
all the language is not to be conceived of as the name of a 
single phenomenon or some phenomenon, as claimed in 
Tractatus. Such a definition supposes the use of words as 
only names. But Wittgenstein believes, this is a mistaken 
notion of language. For, besides that a word can be used 
as a name, it can also be used in numerous other ways 
too. There are other domains of language where many 
different words are used in many different ways. From 
these remarks we possibly come to the recognition of the 
fact that Wittgenstein needs to present to us a different 
theory and definition of language by which a limitation to 
proper names would be unnecessary. From the fact that 
even the names themselves can mean in many ways 
Wittgenstein finds himself in a need of defining language in 
a different way. In Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein writes; “ For a large class of cases-though not 
for all in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ ”, it can be 
defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language ” PI.§43(P.20e). By this definition of language 
Wittgenstein introduces a new notion to the field of 
language. This is, namely, the language-game. What is a 
language-game? According to Wittgenstein, a language-
game is a “ whole, consisting of language and the actions 
into which it is woven ” Ibid §7(P.5e). It can be said that it is 
the language-game by which the use of a certain word in a 
certain way is made possible. When a word is used in a 
certain way, there is a related language-game in which the 
word gains a distinguishing meaning. Before pointing to 
the way by which a word gains a meaning, let us 
remember, Wittgenstein’s own words: “ Here the term  
‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact 
that speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of 
                                                     
2  Here the term “ object ” can be replaced by the term “ entity ” for a 
better understanding of the case. 




life ” Ibid §23(P.11e). Simply what he says is that the 
language-games are expressions of  people’s form of life 
or mode of activity. So the definition of language turns out 
to be that when a word is used in a certain way, it is also 
used in relation to a related human action. This is to say 
that words used are to reflect some human actions, which 
are found in a form of life. There is always a social context 
in which a word is used in a certain manner, and this social 
context relates us to a human action undeniably. This 
clarifies that when a word is used in a certain way for 
gaining a meaning, this use of word or language-game 
always is in a relation to a human action into which, as 
Wittgenstein holds, the word is woven. 
As becomes clear, different language-games 
brings us into a connection with different human actions or 
mode of activities. For such language-games, let us take 
an example; the word “ die ” used in a battle by a 
commander will relate us to the defined human action of 
attacking and taking all the risks for winning the battle. 
Another example, suppose one going to a shop and says “ 
Marlboro ”: what follows the utterance of the word “ 
Marlboro ” is that the shopkeeper walks towards a certain 
shelf and picks one of the cigarette packets, on which “ 
Marlboro ” is written, from the shelf and hands it to me. In 
this language-game the use of the word “ Marlboro ” 
relates us to a defined human action which has been 
described above.  
In such and similar language-games we are 
always capable of defining a referential relation between a 
language-game and a human action or mode of activity. 
Such a referential relation is considerable for every 
language-game by which the use of a certain word gains a 
meaning: this referential relation can diagrammatically be 
indicated as follows; 
Language-game I------------->Related human action 
(use of a word)          (mode of activity) 
Figure.1 
We can also diagrammatically represent the 
examples given above. Concerning the language-games 
by which the word “ die ” and the word “ Marlboro ” are put 
to a certain use, the languages or language-games are in 
relation to two separate human actions; 
Language-game I---------Victory(winning the battle) 
(use of “ die ”)    (Related human action) 
 Figure.2 
Language-game I----------->The walk towards shelf 
(use of “Marlboro”)             (Related human action) 
  Figure.3 
From the above diagrams it becomes clear that a 
language-game by which a word is put to a certain use is 
always in a relation to a human action or mode of activity. 
Though a human action always is in a relation to a form of 
life, we shall not say more about this relation rather than 
pointing to it. Returning to our original argument, the 
relation of a language-game to a related human action, we 
can say that such a referential relation between them 
becomes clear from the plainly written words of 
Wittgenstein; Wittgenstein holds that “ the speaking of a 
language is part of an activity ” Ibid §23 (P.11e). Namely, 
as soon as we utter a word depending upon the way in 
which it is used, we refer to a related human action or 
mode of activity. In the Wittgenstenian sense, there is no a 
language-game which does not relate us to a human 
action. For the language or language-game becomes the 
part of the human activity to which it intentionally refers. So 
not only definition of language-game but also its actual 
occurrence depends on the referential relation between a 
language-game and a human action. Namely, without a 
related human action we cannot speak of a language-
game. Because a certain word used in a language-game 
can have a meaning by depending upon that there is a 
social convention relating our use of the word to a certain 
human activity.      Furthermore the language-game which 
suggests us a possible meaning for the word used is 
unified with the human actions. The language-games and 
human actions constitute a unification by which language-
games become definable. The unification of the language-
game with the human action clarifies that one cannot be 
separated from another. This inseparateness is not 
supposed by definition, but the uses into which words are 
put makes it clear. To put this in a similar way it can be 
said that the language-game is included in the related 
human actions, or language-games have a participation in 
the human actions. Naturally, the involvement of the 
language-games in the related human actions clarifies that 
the language-game and related human action are fused 
into one another. This is claimed by the idea held by 
Wittgenstein that the language-games are part of human 
activities upon which they are inevitably directed. Such a 
fusion or unification of language-game with the human 
action describes a dependency of one onto another in 
terms of its occurrence if to be held that a language-game 
always refers to a related human action. This view can be 
explained by an example such that; let us suppose 
somebody who walks backwards and counting numbers 
simultaneously. Now the point is that here there is a 
certain human activity or mode of activity, though it is 
imaginative, but there is no  language-game which relates 
us to this human activity, in other words there is no  use of 
any word or language into which the above human action 
is woven. This is because, as one may suppose, there is 
not a human action of such a kind, simply the described 
human activity does not exist at all. When a human action 
of such kind does not exist, it is also impossible to suppose 
the existence of a related language-game into which the 
above human action would be vowen. 
The same kind of analysis of the referential 
relation between a language-game and a human action 
can also be conceivable from the side of language-game. 
Let us consider the supposed word “ kima ” as a language-
game for a special use. If there is no a human action into 
which this use of the above word as a language-game is 
vowen, then we cannot speak of a language-game. For, if 
in Wittgensteinian sense a language-game is part of an 
activity into which it is vowen, then the question arises in 
what way the above example can be thought of as a 
language-game. For there is no such use of the word “ 
kima ” as the language-game suggests. This also clarifies 
that there is not a related human action to which the use of 
the word “ kima ” as a language-game would refer to. 
Mainly the reason for not accepting this use of the word “ 
kima ” as a language-game is the non-existence of a 
related human action or mode of activity to which it would 
hold a referential relation. 
As far as I can say, beside the referential relation 
of a language-game to a human action in general, it is also 
the case that different language-games or uses of one and 
the same word relates us to different human actions. But a 
detailed study of such cases, I believe, comprises another 
independent investigation. 
Abbreviation 
The following abbreviation is used throughout the 
whole text in this paper: 
PL: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations; the English Text of the Third Edition, 
translated by G.E.M. Anscombe.   
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